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I. Introduction
The following is an update on Texas’s case law and legislative activity
relating to oil, gas and mineral law from August 1, 2016 to July 1, 2017.
II. Case Law
A. Production in Paying Quantities and Lease Maintenance
1. BP America Production Company v. Laddex, Ltd. 1
BP acquired a 1971 oil and gas lease that contained a 5-year primary
term, and continued “as long thereafter as oil or gas is produced from said
land hereunder.” 2 The Lessee drilled one producing well that steadily
produced until its production sharply decreased in August 2005. 3
Production resumed in November 2006. 4 Lessors’ attorney sent BP a letter
in April 2006 claiming that the lease had terminated for failure to produce
in paying quantities; BP did not respond. 5 The Lessors granted a top lease
to Laddex in March 2007. 6 In April 2007, the lessee of the top lease sued,
seeking lease termination based on failure to produce in paying quantities.7
The top lease language provided:
[T]he primary term of this lease shall commence [(a)] upon the
date written releases are filed . . . or (b) upon the date a judgment
of a court of competent jurisdiction terminating the base
lease . . . becomes final and nonappealable . . . . This Lease is
intended to and does include and vest in Lessee any and all
remainder and reversionary interest and after-acquired title of

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

513 S.W.3d 476 (Tex. 2017).
Id. at 477-78.
Id. at 478.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Lessor in the Leased Premises upon expiration of any prior oil,
gas or mineral lease . . . . 8
In Texas, production that does not permit a lessee to pay operating
expenses will not keep a lease in existence, even though the lease does not
specifically require paying quantities but merely provides that the lease will
continue for so long as “oil or gas is produced.” 9 Clifton v. Koontz 10 refined
that rule of law, for which there is now a two prong test: (1) Does income
from a well’s production exceed operating and marketing costs? 11 If yes,
the inquiry ends, and production in paying quantities is established. If no,
(2) under all relevant circumstances, would a reasonably prudent operator
continue to operate in the same manner in hope of making a profit, and not
for mere speculation? 12
BP moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
arguing that the top lease violated the Rule Against Perpetuities.13 The
court denied this motion.14 The trial court asked the jury if (1) the well
failed to produce in paying quantities from August 1, 2005 to October 31,
2006, and (2) if, under all the relevant circumstances, a reasonably prudent
operator would not continue, for the sole purpose of making a profit and not
merely for speculation, operating the well as it was between those dates. 15
The jury not only determined that there was a lack of production in paying
quantities between August 2005 and October 2006, but that a reasonably
prudent operator would not have continued to operate the well for profit. 16
As a result, the 1971 lease terminated. 17 BP appealed, claiming that (1) the
top lease violated the Rule Against Perpetuities; (2) no evidence of lack of
production in paying quantities or that a reasonably prudent operator
wouldn’t continue to operate the well; and (3) the jury charge allowed
consideration of incompetent expert testimony. 18
On appeal, the trial court’s ruling was reversed and remanded, as the
lease was found not to violate the Rule Against Perpetuities, since Texas
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id. at 482 (citing Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex. 1942)).
325 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. 1959).
Id. at 691.
Id.
Laddex, 513 S.W.3d at 478-89.
Id. at 479.
Id.
Id. at 483-87.
Id.
Id.
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leases create a fee simple determinable with the lessor retaining a
possibility of reverter, which is a vested future interest.19 However, the trial
judge erred in limiting the jury’s consideration of profitability to a specific
fifteen month period, preventing consideration of the fact of profitability
before and after. 20
On review by the supreme court, the issues were (1) whether a top lease
can be saved from the Rule Against Perpetuities (the “Rule”) by purporting
to convey a “possibility of reverter” which may never revert to lessor, and
(2) whether a jury can consider profitable production post-lease
expiration? 21
As to the first point of inquiry, the court noted that the Rule does not
apply to present or future interests that vest at their creation, regardless of
when it becomes vested in possession, and pointed out that a typical oil and
gas lease actually conveys the mineral estate as a determinable fee subject
to the lessor’s possibility of reverter if the condition terminating the
determinable fee occurs. 22 The court pointed out that the possibility of
reverter vests at the time the lease is executed, although same is not
possessory at the time of execution.23
BP argued that to the extent Laddex acquired the Lessors’ possibility of
reverter, the lease’s language precluded vesting of that interest until the
occurrence of a future event, namely the filing of written releases, or upon a
court judgment terminating the lease becoming final and unappealable. 24
The court held that the Laddex lease resulted in a present “partial
alienation” of the Lessors’ possibility of reverter, and that Laddex had
acquired an estate capable of ripening into a fee simple determinable
interest upon expiration of the underlying lease, and, as such, did not
violate the Rule. 25
As to the second point of inquiry, the court pointed out that under Skelly
Oil Co. v. Archer, a determination whether a well is producing in paying
quantities is a question of fact for the jury, with the lessor having the

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. 479, 482.
22. Id. at 480 (citation omitted).
23. Id. (citing Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1991)); see also
Kelly v. Womack, 268 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1954); Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex.
1991).
24. Laddex, 513 S.W.3d at 480.
25. Id. at 482.
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burden of proving a lack of such production in order to terminate a lease. 26
Further, the court emphasized Clifton principles in its holding, such as
“there can be no limit as to time, whether it be days, weeks or months, to be
taken into consideration in determining whether paying production from a
lease has ceased.” 27 BP urged that although reversal based on the trial
court’s jury charge limiting the jury’s consideration to only the 15 month
period of decreased production was warranted, it was instead entitled to
rendition of a judgment in its favor, rather than remand, because the
evidence conclusively established the lease’s profitability over a reasonable
period of time. 28 The court, in affirming the court of appeals, held that the
jury charge did not allow the jury to fulfill its duties and that a reasonable
jury could have differed as to whether the well ceased to produce in paying
quantities, and therefore remand for a new trial was proper.29
2. BP America Production Company v. Red Deer Resources, LLC 30
A 1962 lease covered 2113 acres, and provided for a five year primary
term. 31 By April, 2009, only production from the Vera Murray Well No. 11
was maintaining the lease.32 In 1994, that well was averaging 200 Mcf per
day, but when BP acquired the lease in 2000 production was less than 100
Mcf per day, and by 2009 had declined to less than 10 Mcf per day. 33
Between March and June 2011, Red Deer acquired top leases, which gave
Red Deer the right to sue to terminate BP’s lease. 34 In May 2012, the well
ceased to produce for seven days and then resumed producing, but only
every other day, and ceased to produce altogether for eight days beginning
June 4. 35 BP shut in the well on June 12 and tendered shut-in payments
June 13, designating June 13, 2012 as the beginning of the shut-in period. 36
The Shut In Provision of the lease at issue provides:

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
2017).
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 482-83 (citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Archer, 356 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. 1961)).
Id. at 482-83 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 484.
Id. at 486-87.
No. 15-0569, 2017 WL 1553112 (Tex. Apr. 28, 2017, reh’g overruled Sept. 22,
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Where gas from any well capable of producing gas . . . is not
sold or used after the primary term and this lease is not otherwise
maintained, lessee may pay or tender as shut-in royalty . . . ,
payable annually on or before the end of each twelve-month
period during which such gas is not sold or used . . . and it shall
be considered that gas is produced in paying quantities, and this
lease shall remain in force for each twelve-month period for
which shut-in royalty is so paid or tendered . . . . 37
The Cessation of Production provision reads: “[i]f production from said
land . . . should cease . . . this lease shall not terminate if lessee commences
mining, drilling or reworking operations on or before the expiration of sixty
days from . . . cessation of production.” 38
Red Deer sued in August 2012, alleging termination because the well
had not produced in paying quantities for the time period ended June 12,
2012. 39 Red Deer also asserted that there was an unexcused total cessation
of production, incapable of rescue by payment of shut-in royalty, since the
well was incapable of producing in paying quantities on June 13, 2012.40
The jury found that the lease did not fail to produce in paying quantities for
the period ended June 12, 2012, but had terminated because of a total
cessation of production on June 13, 2012. 41 The appellate court affirmed. 42
In its analysis, the supreme court noted that Red Deer bore the burden of
proving that the well in question experienced a total cessation of production
for a period of at least 60 days, and that no savings provision, such as the
shut-in royalty clause, would maintain the lease during that time. 43 The
lease at issue provides that it shall survive on payment of shut-in payment
being made within one year after gas is last “sold or used” from a well
capable of producing gas. 44 Facts indicated that the last date any gas was
sold or used was June 4, and BP tendered shut-in payments June 13, 2012. 45
The Court stated that a retroactive shut-in clause, such as the one at issue,
allows the operator to shut-in a well up to twelve months after production
ceases, with constructive production relating back to the date gas was last
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id. at *1.
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sold or used, and that to negate BP’s invocation of its shut-in rights, Red
Deer must prove that the well was incapable of production in paying
quantities over a reasonable time period as of June 4, 2012. 46 Looking at the
trial record, the court noted that Red Deer had not obtained such a finding. 47
Moreover, the court found that the jury charge was improper, insofar as
same instructed the jury to determine whether June 13, 2012 was the
relevant date to consider in deciding whether the well was incapable of
producing in paying quantities, since that was not the date gas was last sold
or used. 48 Accordingly, the court reversed the appellate court’s decision and
rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of BP. 49
B. Operations
1. ExxonMobil Corp. v. Lazy R Ranch, et al. 50
ExxonMobil conducted operations on the Lazy R Ranch for nearly 60
years until it sold its operations in 2008.51 The Ranch hired an
environmental manager to determine the extent of any contamination
caused by ExxonMobil’s operations, if any. 52 That report, dated March 31,
2009, identified 4 areas totaling 1.20 acre where hydrocarbon
contamination levels exceeded state limits, and warned of a threat posed by
same to groundwater. 53 In October of that year, the Ranch sued; its
amended petition sought injunctive relief requiring remediation, regardless
of the cost. 54 ExxonMobil moved for summary judgment, alleging the
claims were barred by the statute of limitations; that plaintiffs were not, as a
matter of law, entitled to the requested relief; and that there was no
evidence of diminution of the value of the property. 55 The trial court
granted ExxonMobil’s summary judgment motion, which decision was
overturned by the appellate court. 56
In its review, the supreme court noted that as to two of the four sites,
operations had ceased prior to 2005, and any contamination at those sites
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at *5.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *10.
511 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. 2017).
Id. at 539.
Id.
Id. at 539-40.
Id. at 540-41.
Id. at 541.
Id. at 542.
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must necessarily have occurred before then, and therefore ExxonMobil’s
claim was barred. 57 As to the other two tracts, the court noted conflicting
evidence regarding when contamination might have occurred, and reversed
the granting of summary judgment. 58
The Ranch argued that the statute of limitations should be tolled by the
discovery rule, which applies when an injury is found to be objectively
verifiable and inherently undiscoverable during the limitations period, and
would result in its claims accruing until they were or should reasonably
have been discovered.59 The court noted that application of the discovery
rule in nuisance cases is rare, as the condition giving cause to the claim is
generally obvious and apparent.60 Further, trial testimony established that
the ranch owner often observed and was routinely informed of spills and
cleanup operations; as a result, the court stated that there was nothing
inherent in the possibility of contamination that kept the Ranch from hiring
its environmental consultant sooner than it did. 61
Finally, the Court affirmed Texas’s adherence to the “economic
feasibility exception” in establishing damages for land contamination, but
limiting repair costs to the loss in the land’s value due to the objectionable
harm. 62
2. Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC 63
Anadarko entered an oil and gas lease with the State of Texas on a
wildlife area, which lease contained restrictions on Anadarko’s ability to
use the surface for exploration and production operations.64 In response,
Anadarko entered into a surface use and subsurface easement agreement
with Briscoe Ranch, the owner of an adjacent tract, which would allow it to
use the surface of that tract to drill from and through in order to access its
leasehold on the adjacent to the state-owned tract. 65 The mineral estate
underlying the Briscoe Ranch tract was under lease to Lightning. 66
Lightning sued, alleging trespass and tortious interference with contract,
57.
58.
59.
60.
2004)).
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See id. at 543-44.
Id.
Id. at 544.
Id. & n.20 (citing Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264 (Tex.
ExxonMobil, 511 S.W.3d at 544.
Id. at 545.
520 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. 2017).
Id. at 43.
Id.
Id.
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and seeking injunctive relief. 67 The district court dismissed Lightning’s
claim, which ruling was affirmed by the appellate court. 68
In its review, the supreme court noted that Lightning’s claim centered on
whether a mineral lessee’s rights include the ability to preclude the surface
owner’s activities not intended to capture the lessee’s minerals, but
intended only to traverse through them. 69 In addressing the trespass claim,
the court noted its earlier holding in Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. West,
that the surface overlying a leased mineral estate is the surface owner’s
property, and those rights include the geological structures beneath the
surface, and a Fifth Circuit case applying Texas law, concluding that the
surface owner owns all non-mineral molecules of the land, i.e., the mass
that undergirds the surface estate.70
Following a review of the dominant estate theory set forth in Getty Oil
Co. v. Jones, 71 which establishes the right of the mineral owner to use so
much of the surface as is reasonably necessary to produce and remove the
minerals therefrom, the court noted limitations on that dominance, and
pointed out that “the rights conveyed by a mineral lease generally
encompass the rights to explore, obtain, produce and possess the minerals
subject to the lease; they do not include the right to possess the specific
place or space where the minerals are located.” 72 Thus, an unauthorized
interference with the place where the minerals are located constitutes a
trespass as to the mineral estate only if the interference infringes on the
lessee’s ability to exercise its rights.73 The court noted that Lightning
speculated that Anadarko’s proposed locations and operations might
interfere with Lightning’s planned use of the property, but that mere
speculation was not enough to justify the granting of injunctive relief,
which requires proof of imminent, irreparable harm. 74
Lightning also argued that Anadarko’s operations would result in a loss
of minerals to which Lightning would otherwise be entitled.75 In response,
67. Id. 45-46.
68. Id. at 43.
69. Id. at 45-46
70. Id. at 46-47 (citing Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. West, 508 S.W.2d 812 (Tex.
1974)); see also Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. Nat’l Park Serv., 630 F.3d 431
(5th Cir. 2011).
71. 470 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. 1971).
72. Lighting Oil Co., 520 S.W.3d at 48-49 (applying principles of Getty Oil Co. and
progeny to support dominance and limitations of the mineral estate in Texas).
73. Id. at 49.
74. Id. (citing Batnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2002)).
75. See id. at 50-51.
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the Court held that “the loss of minerals Lightning will suffer . . . is not a
sufficient injury to support a claim for trespass.” 76 In reaching its
conclusion, the court indicated that it was weighing “the interests of society
and the oil and gas industry against the interest of the individual operator,”
and finding that Anadarko’s proposed operations would allow for
recovering the most minerals while drilling the fewest wells, resulting in
reduced waste. 77 Finally, the court pointed out that Lightning’s tortious
interference claim must necessarily fail, since Anadarko had the legal right
to do what it planned to do. 78
3. Ring Energy v. Trey Res., Inc. 79
Trey Resources, Inc. applied for and obtained nine permits from the
Railroad Commission (the “RRC”) to inject fluids into designated wells in
Andrews County. 80 Ring Energy, Inc. contends that Trey did not
substantially comply with the requirement to provide a copy of the
application to any surface owner or operator within a half mile of an
injection well. 81 Ring did not protest the permits with the RRC; the RRC
granted the applications.82 Before Trey began any injection operations,
Ring sued in Andrews County seeking injunctive relief, claiming that it
would suffer irreparable waste damage. 83 Trey moved to dismiss on the
basis that Ring did not exhaust its administrative remedies before the RRC
and any such appeal must be filed in Travis County. 84 The trial court
granted Trey’s motion. 85
The court focused on two provisions of the Texas Natural Resources
Code; in particular, Section 85.321 and Section 85.322. 86 Those provisions,
respectively, reads as follows:

76.
77.
78.
79.
pet.).
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id. at 50 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Id. at 53.
No. 08-15-00080-CV, 2017 WL 192911 (Tex. App.—El Paso Jan. 18, 2017, no
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
See id. at *5.
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[A] party . . . that may be damaged by another party[’s] . . .
waste . . . may sue for and recover damages and have any other
relief to which he may be entitled at law or in equity. 87
[N]o suit by or against the commission . . . shall impair or
abridge or delay a cause of action for damages or other relief that
an owner of land or a producer . . . [might have for violation of a
rule or order of the commission]. 88
Trey argued that if Ring suffers damages such a claim would be cognizable
under § 85.321, but only as to an action filed in Travis County. 89 Ring
responded that § 85.321 grants the state courts jurisdiction to hear claims
for injunctive relief.90 The court determined, after analyzing the the statutes
using several grammatical and stylistic approaches, that § 85.322 allows
litigants to obtain injunctive relief at courts outside of Travis County. 91
Trey also contended that the RRC has exclusive jurisdiction over
injection wells until all administrative remedies have been exhausted.92 The
court noted that, in addition to § 85.321 and § 85.322, another Texas
appellate court recently determined that the RRC did not have exclusive
jurisdiction over injection wells in In re Discovery Operating, Inc.. 93
Because the court determined that both the RRC and the court have
authority to review and adjudicate initial disputes, it again relied on In re
Discovery and the lack of “a clear remedy before the RRC” to find that the
RRC did not have primary jurisdiction.94
The court ultimately held that “the Legislature intended to allow
preinjury injunctive relief in the county where the injury is threatened,” and
reversed the trial court to allow Ring the opportunity to demonstrate its
need for injunctive relief.95

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.321 (West 2011).
Id. § 85.322.
Ring Energy, 2017 WL 192911, at *5.
Id.
See id. at *8.
See id.
Id. at *9 (citing 216 S.W.3d 898 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, orig. proceeding)).
Id. at *10 (citation omitted).
Id. at *12.
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4. Crystal River Oil & Gas, LLC v. Patton 96
A 1948 lease (the “Scoggins Lease”) covering property in Stonewall
County contained the following provisions:
2. Subject to the other provisions herein contained, this lease
shall be for a term of ten years from this date (called “primary
term”) and as long thereafter as oil, gas or other mineral is
produced from said land hereunder.
5. If prior to discovery of oil or gas on said land Lessee should
drill a dry hole or holes thereon, or if after discovery of oil, or
gas the production thereof should cease from any cause, this
lease shall not terminate if Lessee commences additional drilling
or re-working operations within sixty (60) days thereafter . . . . 97
After 20 years of production of oil and saltwater, the saltwater disposal
well on the property became inoperable and the producing wells were shut
down. 98 Robert Patton reviewed the RRC production records, decided to
lease the property covered by the Scoggins Lease based on his observation
that there had been no production for several months and sent a letter to
Crystal River Oil & Gas, LLC and RMS Monte Christo, LLC contending
that the Scoggins Lease had terminated.99
At trial, the jury was asked whether “the Defendants fail[ed] to
commence drilling or reworking activities on the producing wells in
question within 60 days after the wells ceased to produce oil and gas?100 At
issue in this case is whether the jury question erroneously included the
phrase “on the producing wells in question” and whether its inclusion
prevented the jury from considering reworking activities performed on the
saltwater disposal well.101
While the jury question presented largely conformed to the Texas Pattern
Jury Charges for such question, the pattern jury charges do not restrict
reworking to only work performed on producing wells. 102 The court
identified “re-working operations” as a key undefined phrase in this

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

510 S.W.3d 226 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2016, no pet.).
Id. at 228.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 228-29.
Id. at 229.
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lease. 103 Relying on the guidance of Cox v. Stowers, 104 which defined
“reworking operations” without restricting operations to work performed on
the producing wells, the court focused on “what an ordinarily competent
operator would do under the same or similar circumstances to restore
production.” 105 The court noted that William & Meyers Oil and Gas Law §
618.1 cites approvingly to precedent offered by Crystal River in Pro-Chem,
Inc. v. Lassetter Petroleum, Inc., in which a Kansas court held that “work
done to secure the use of a saltwater disposal well can constitute reworking
operations under a cessation-of-production clause.” 106
The court held that “in the absence of a restriction in the lease that only
work performed on the producing wells constitutes reworking operations,
we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting the jury
question to only work performed on the producing wells.”107 Because the
error in the jury charge related to the critically contested issue, the court
found that the trial court’s error caused harm and remanded the case for a
new trial. 108
C. Pooling
1. Samson Exploration, LLC v. T.S. Reed Properties, Inc. 109
Samson Exploration formed two pooled units, the Joyce DuJay No. 1
Gas Unit and the Joyce DuJay “A” No. 1 Gas Unit. 110 The units overlapped
one another as to depths and acreage for the most part, but the “A” No. 1
Unit included one additional lease not included in the No. 1 Unit. 111 One
well was located upon land included in both units, and produced from the
interval pooled in both.112 Samson paid royalties on this well under the first
unit (which did not include the additional lease), contending that the second
unit was invalid, and the unpaid lessors sued. 113
In seeking to excuse its error, Samson argued that pooling necessarily
effects a cross-conveyance of title and that a pooled unit is not valid unless
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
786 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1990, no writ).
Crystal River, 510 S.W.3d at 229-30.
Id. at 230 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 231.
521 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. 2017).
Id. at 771.
Id. at 772.
Id.
Id. at 773.
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title is cross-conveyed, and that since title cannot be conveyed twice, and
the production interval for the disputed unit was previously committed to
another pooled unit, the subsequently pooled unit was invalid.114 The trial
and appellate courts rejected this approach, and the supreme court affirmed,
holding:
Under the law in Texas, pooling implicates both contract and
property law—authority to pool emanates from contract but
pooing agreements give rise to interests in realty.The crossconveyance theory of title can be critical . . . but Samson’s
argument in this case is a theoretical construct that holds no
water. Considering the pertinent authority, we discern no
impediment to enforcing Samson’s obligations in this case under
a contract theory even if the pooling designation failed to effect a
new conveyance of title. 115
Moreover, the court pointed out that although its holding would have an
adverse economic impact on Samson, the holding was brought about by
Samson’s own making. 116
D. Conveyance and Deed Construction
1. James H. Davis, Individually and D/B/A JD Minerals, and JDMI, LLC
v. Mark Muelle 117
A 1991 mineral deed to JD Minerals imprecisely described ten tracts of
land in the following manner: “1) 704.00 acres out of the G.W. PETTY, ET
AL, A-582, ET AL, known as the ‘AMOCO PRODUCING COMPANY –
JOHN HARRISON JR. ‘B’.” 118 Following the putative descriptions was the
statement that “Grantor agrees to execute any supplemental instrument
requested by Grantee for a more complete or accurate description of said
land.” 119 Beneath that was the following paragraph:
The “Lands” subject to this deed also include all strips, gores,
roadways, water bottoms and other lands adjacent to or
contiguous with the lands specifically described above and
114.
115.
116.
117.
2017).
118.
119.

Id. at 770.
Id. at 777-78.
Id. at 780-81.
No. 16-0155, 2017 WL 2299316 (Tex. May 26, 2017, reh’g overruled Sept. 22,
Id. at *1 n.8.
Id. at *1.
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owned or claimed by Grantors. If the description above proves
incorrect in any respect or does not include these adjacent or
contiguous lands, Grantor shall, without additional
consideration, execute, acknowledge and deliver to Grant[ee], its
successors and assigns, such instruments as are useful or
necessary to correct the description and evidence such correction
in the appropriate public records. Grantor hereby conveys to
Grantee all of the mineral, royalty, and overriding royalty
interest owned by Grantor in Harrison County, whether or not
same is herein above correctly described.120
In 2011, the Grantor in the 1991 deed conveyed the same specific
properties to Mark J. Mueller, but employing more precise descriptions. 121
Mueller then sued Davis to quiet title to the mineral interests, arguing that
the descriptions in the 1991 deed were insufficient to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds, requiring that property to be conveyed be identified with reasonable
certainty. 122 At trial, Davis’s motion for summary judgment was granted,
and a take-nothing judgment issued against Mueller. 123
On appeal, Mueller argued that the general granting clause, that
purporting to convey all of Grantor’s interest in Harrison County, is
ambiguous, because it was located in the same paragraph as the Mother
Hubbard clause, a catch-all for small, overlooked interests.124 The appellate
court agreed and reversed, concluding that the intent of the parties was a
fact issue to be decided by a jury. 125
The supreme court, in its review, acknowledged that the specific
property descriptions in the 1991 deed failed to satisfy the statute of frauds,
but also noted the long-standing recognition of general granting clauses as
valid and effective. 126 The court rejected Mueller’s argument that the
location of the general grant in proximity to the Mother Hubbard clause
rendered it ambiguous and noted that if the general grant were held to apply
only to the small strips contemplated by the Mother Hubbard clause, it
would accomplish nothing other than that accomplished by the Mother

120. Id.
121. Id. at *2.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. & n.21 (citing Holloway’s Unknown Heirs v. Whatley, 131 S.W.2d 89 (Tex.
1939); Smith v. Westall, 13 S.W. 540 (Tex. 1890); Witt v. Harlan, 2 S.W. 41 (Tex. 1886)).
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Hubbard clause itself.127 The court concluded by stating that the “general
grant’s conveyance of ‘all of the mineral, royalty, and overriding royalty
interest owned by Grantor in Harrison County, whether or not same is
herein above correctly described’ could not be clearer. All means all.” 128
2. Benedict G. Wenske & Elizabeth Wenske v. Steve Ealy and Deborah
Ealy 129
A 1998 mineral deed reserved a one-fourth (1/4th) nonparticipating
royalty for a term of 25 years.130 The Grantees under that deed later sold the
property, in 2003, reserving an undivided three-eighths (3/8th) mineral
interest. 131 The later deed provided that if the mineral estate was subject to
an existing lease or production, the lease or production, and the benefits
from it, would be allocated in proportion to ownership in the mineral
estate. 132 The mineral interest was made subject to the one-fourth (1/4)
royalty previously reserved. 133
In 2011, the Grantors and Grantees under the 2003 deed entered into an
oil and gas lease, and a dispute subsequently arose as to who would bear the
nonparticipating royalty burden, the Grantors urging that their mineral
interest was unencumbered by same and that the Grantees would bear all of
it. 134 Both the trial and appellate courts ruled that the burden was to be
borne proportionately. 135
In affirming the lower courts, the supreme court acknowledged the
historical application of strict rules for deed construction, and the modern
approach based on determining the parties’ intent from the four corners of
the instrument.136 In its rejection of mechanical, hard-and-fast rules of
interpretation, the Court adopted a more holistic approach focused on the
intent of the parties as expressed within the four corners of the deed, giving
words their plain meaning, and harmonizing all parts of an instrument, even
if particular parts appear contradictory or inconsistent. 137

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at *3.
Id. (emphasis added).
521 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. 2017).
Id. at 793.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 793-94.
Id. at 794.
See id. (citations omitted).
See id. at 797-99.
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The court recognized the general rule that a previously reserved interest
burdens the entire mineral estate, but held that such a rule is not necessarily
determinative of the parties’ intent, since they are free to contract
otherwise. 138
3. Greer v. Shook 139
A 1927 mineral deed was subject to an existing oil and gas lease. 140 The
deed conveyed
an undivided one-sixteenth (1/16) interest in and to all of the oil,
gas and other minerals in, under and that may be produced . . .
[G]rantee is purchasing one-half of the royalty and one-half (1/2)
of the minerals . . . subject to [an existing oil and gas lease], but
covers one-half (1/2) of all [royalty payable under said lease, and
when the lease terminates an] undivided one-sixteenth (1/16) of
the lease interest and all future rentals . . . shall be owned by . . .
Grantee, he owning one sixteenth of all oil, gas and other
minerals . . . . 141
The deed also stated that Grantee would never be required to join in the
execution of future oil, gas and mineral leases.142 Long after the lease
expired, a new lease was taken, providing for a one-fourth (1/4) royalty,
and the lessee filed an interpleader action seeking a ruling as to the interest
owned by the successors of the grantee in the 1927 deed. 143 The trial court
ruled that the Grantee’s successors were entitled to one-half (1/2) of the
royalty provided for under the new lease, or one-eighth (1/8). 144 The
appellate court affirmed, finding ambiguity in the deed, but ruling that due
to the near-universal use of one-eighth (1/8) royalties at the time of the deed
in question and the fact that landowners commonly believed they only
owned a one-eighth (1/8) interest rather than the entire mineral estate in the
possibility of reverter (the “estate misconception” theory), meaning that the
1927 deed conveyed an undivided one-half (1/2) nonexecutive mineral
interest.145
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
503 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.).
Id. at 575-76.
Id. at 576.
Id.
See id. at 577.
Id. at 575.
See id. at 590-92.
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4. Laborde Properties, L.P. v. U.S. Shale Energy II, LLC 146
A 1951 deed contained the following reservation:
There is reserved and excepted . . . an undivided one-half interest
in and to the . . . royalty . . . in and under and that may be
produced . . . , same being equal to an undivided one-sixteenth.
This reservation is what is generally termed a nonparticipating
Royalty Reservation[.] 147
A dispute subsequently arose regarding whether the reservation entitled
the grantors’ successors to one-half (1/2) of the one-fifth (1/5) royalty for
provided for under a current lease, or a fixed one-sixteenth (1/16). 148 The
trial court ruled that they were entitled to one-half (1/2) of one-fifth (1/5). 149
On appeal, the appellate court reversed, holding that to rule otherwise
would be to require it to ignore the plain language in the deed calling for
“same being equal to an undivided one-sixteenth.” 150
5. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Chevron Midcontinent, L.P.151
In dispute in this case is the interest conveyed by a 1903 deed from
W.H.C. Goode to Panhandle & Gulf Railway Company which states that
“the said party of the first . . . does GRANT, BARGAIN, SELL,
RELINQUISH and CONVEY unto the said party of the second part, and
unto its successors and assigns, . . . , for a right of way, that certain strip of
land hereinafter described.” 152 The deed includes a description of a
surveyed line and describes “the said railway right of way being 100 feet
wide on each side of the center line.”153 The deed includes a habendum
clause which purports to define the interest being conveyed as being “in fee
simple, unto the said party of the second party . . . its successors and assigns
forever.” 154

146. 04-16-00168-CV, 2016 WL 5922404 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 12,
2016), reconsideration en banc denied 04-16-00168-CV, 2016 WL 7445084 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio Dec. 28, 2016, no pet.)
147. Id. at *1.
148. Id. at *2.
149. Id.
150. Id. at *10.
151. No. 08-16-00119-CV, 2017 WL 1076540 (Tex. App.—El Paso Mar. 22, 2017, no
pet.).
152. Id. at *1.
153. Id. at *2.
154. Id.
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After determining that the use of the phrase “right of way” does
automatically convey only an easement, the court next applied to its review
the “Neale rule” which says:
[A] deed which by the terms of the granting clause grants, sells
and conveys to the grantee a “right of way” in or over a tract of
land conveys only an easement . . . [but] a deed which in the
granting clause grants, sells and conveys a tract or strip of land
conveys the title in fee, even though in a subsequent clause or
paragraph of the deed the land conveyed is referred to as a right
of way. 155
Because the deed at issue has blended language, the court found that
application of the Neale rule was not dispositive as to what was
conveyed. 156 Nevertheless, the court held that this deed is a surface
easement, reasoning that use of the word “over” in the opening clause
shows that Goode did not intend to convey the entirety of the land
described and the phrase “for a right of way” in front of the phrase “strip of
land” could be understood as limiting the nature of the conveyance. 157
Finally, the court considered the use of the phrase “fee simple” in the
habendum clause. 158 Acknowledging that “fee simple” can often be used
both to describe the size of the estate and rights associated therewith, as
well as the term of any durational or conditional qualifiers.159 Understood
as the latter, there would be no conflict between the granting language and
the habendum clause; the granting clause would define the type of property
rights, while the habendum would identify the term. 160 While the court
recognized that this approach is “rational, intuitive and sensible” it declined
to adopt this approach due to the lack of Texas authority. 161

155. Id. at *4 (quoting Tex. Elec. Ry. Co. v. Neale, 151 Tex. 526, 252 S.W.2d 451, 453
(1952)).
156. Chevron Midcontinent, 2017 WL 1076540, at *5.
157. See id. at *6-7.
158. Id. at *8.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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E. Pipelines
1. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC v. Texas Rice Land Partners,
Ltd. 162
In 2007, Denbury began to plan and construct a carbon dioxide pipeline
over land owned by Texas Rice Land Partners, which was contested by the
landowner. 163 In response, Denbury filed the required form with the RRC,
claiming common carrier status, which would allow it to exercise eminent
domain authority, and also filed suit seeking injunctive relief against Texas
Rice Land. 164 While proceedings were underway, Denbury completed its
survey and commenced construction of the pipeline.165 At the time, Texas
pipeline companies were able to claim common carrier status simply by so
indicating on RCC form T-4. 166
When this controversy first reached the Texas Supreme Court, the court
held that in order to authorize eminent domain, the Texas Constitution
requires objective evidence that the pipeline will serve the public, rather
than the builder’s exclusive use.167 Further, the court enunciated a new test,
one requiring that once challenged, the party claiming common carrier
status must prove “a reasonable probability that the pipeline will at some
point after construction serve the public by transporting gas for one or more
customers who will either retain ownership of their gas or sell it to parties
other than the carrier.” 168 Looking at the facts in issue, the court held that
Denbury’s claimed intent to negotiate with unaffiliated parties for the
transport of their gas raised only the possibility, and not a reasonable
probability, that the pipeline once completed would serve the public, and
remanded the matter to the District Court of Jefferson County (the “district
court”). 169 The district court heard evidence of transportation agreements
with unaffiliated parties which were entered into post-construction, and
granted Denbury’s motion for summary judgment, finding Denbury to be a
common carrier, and thus entitled to eminent domain authority. 170
162. 510 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. 2017)
163. Id. at 911.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 912.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 913 (citing Tex. Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas,
LLC, 363 S.W. 3d 192, 200 (Tex. 2012)).
168. See Texas Rice, 510 S.W.3d at 913 (internal quotations omitted and emphasis
added).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 911-12.
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The Beaumont Court of Appeals overturned the district court ruling,
holding in essence that the pipeline company was required to prove it had
the intent to serve as a common carrier at the time the pipeline was
proposed. 171 That decision was overturned by the supreme court, which
reinstated the district court’s decision. 172
In its opinion, the court noted that its “reasonable probability test” is an
objective one, not requiring the pipeline company to prove the necessary
intent prior to construction, and instead allowed that evidence of postconstruction contracts with unaffiliated parties were relevant and
admissible. 173 The court pointed out that such contracts could be used to
establish a reasonable probability that at some point after construction the
pipeline would serve the public, and also to establish specific potential
customers near the pipeline’s route.174 The court also identified the
regulatory atmosphere, the proximity of the pipeline to potential customers,
and the actual use by unaffiliated parties as potentially relevant evidence.175
III. Texas Legislative Update
A. House Bill 1818 176
Effective September 1, 2017, Section 81.01001(a) of the Natural
Resources Code is amended to provide for the continuance of the RRC until
September 1, 2029. Sections 81.065 and 81.066 are added to the Natural
Resources Code, requiring, in the instance of Section 81.065, that the RRC
to develop and implement a policy to encourage the use of appropriate
alternative dispute resolution procedures for addressing disputes under the
commission’s jurisdiction, and requiring in the instance of Section 81.066,
that the oil and gas division of the RRC develop an annual plan to use oil
and gas monitoring and enforcement resources to ensure public safety and
protect the environment. With respect to Section 81.066, the Commission
must seek input from stakeholders, maintain information about monitoring
and enforcement efforts, and collect data regarding violations of statutes or
Commission rules related to oil and gas. The plan will be published
annually on the Commission’s website no later than July 1 of the year
171. See id. at 911.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 915-18.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Act of May 10, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Tex. H.B. 1818 (amending TEX. NAT. RES.
CODE § 81 et seq.).
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preceding the year in which the plan will be implemented. Section 81.071 is
also added to the Natural Resources Code, providing that the commission
may establish pipeline safety and regulatory fees to be assessed for permits
or registrations for pipelines, specifically including the establishment of
fees to be assessed annually against permit or registration holders. Such
fees should be sufficient to support pipeline sage and regulatory program
costs and may be based on any number of factors, including the length of
the pipeline, the number of new permits or registrations, or the number of
pipeline systems.
B. House Bill 129 177
Effective September 1, 2017, Sections 91.501 and 91.506 of the Natural
Resources Code are amended to provide that the information required by
Section 91.502 to be delivered to the royalty interest owner must be
included on the check stub, an attachment to the payment form, or another
remittance advice that accompanies the payment unless the payor has the
consent of the royalty interest owner to provide the information in another
manner.

177. Act of May 23, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Tex. H.B. 129 (amending TEX. NAT. RES.
CODE § 91 et seq.).
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